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Would domestic terrorists use biological
weapons?1 The conventional wisdom among
experts has been that terrorists want a lot of
people watching, not a lot of people dead and are
unlikely to turn to weapons of mass destruction.2
A new school of thought proposes that improved
technology has made biological attacks resulting
in hundreds of thousands or millions of deaths all
but inevitable. While terrorists are increasingly
interested in weapons of mass destruction,
proponents of the latter view exaggerate the
threat. Using biological weapons to create mass
casualties would require more than having
biological agents in hand. The terrorists would
need to disseminate the agent, which presents
technical and organizational obstacles that few
domestic groups could surmount. In addition,
relatively few terrorists would want to kill
millions of people, even if they could.
For most terrorists, the costs of escalation to
biological weapons would seem to outweigh the
benefits. Most modern terrorists have had
substantively rational goals, such as attaining
national autonomy or establishing a government
purportedly more representative of the peoples
will. Escalating to such frightening weapons
would result in a massive government crack-
down and could alienate the groups supporters.
Biological weapons are also dangerous to
produce. A number of Aum Shinrikyo members
reportedly damaged their own health while
working on biological agents. Additionally, some
terrorists may perceive moral constraints.3
Candidates for successful use of biological
weapons represent the intersection of three sets:
groups that want to use these weapons despite
formidable political risks; groups that can
acquire the agent and a dissemination device
(however crude); and groups whose organiza-
tional structure enables them to deliver or
disseminate the agent covertly. The intersection
of these sets is small but growing, especially for
low-technology attacks such as contaminating
food or disseminating biological agents in an
enclosed space. Major attacks are also becoming
more likely. In the sections that follow, we
consider eroding motivational, technical, and
organizational constraints.
Motivational Factors
Getting Attention
Some terrorists may turn to biological
weapons because they believe it would attract
more attention to their cause than conventional
attacks. Studies of perceived risk show an
inexact correlation between scientists assess-
ment of risk and the level of fear invoked by risky
technologies and activities.4 Biological weapons
are mysterious, unfamiliar, indiscriminate,
uncontrollable, inequitable, and invisible, all
characteristics associated with heightened fear.
Economic Terrorism
Unlike conventional weapons, radiologic,
chemical, and biological agents could be used to
destroy crops, poison foods, or contaminate
pharmaceutical products. They could also be
used to kill livestock. (Conventional weapons
could be used for the same purposes, albeit less
efficiently.) Terrorists might use these agents to
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attack corporations perceived to be icons of the
target country, for example, by contaminating
batches of Coca-Cola, Stolichnaya vodka, or
Guinness stout. Terrorists could attempt to
disseminate anthrax with the explicit goal of
imposing expensive clean-up costs on a target
government.
Millenarianism
The millenarian idea is that the present age
is corrupt and that a new age will dawn after a
cleansing apocalypse. Only a lucky few (usually
selected on the basis of adherence to doctrine or
ritual) will survive the end of time and
experience paradise.5 Some millenarians believe
that the saved will have to endure the 7 years of
violence and struggle of the apocalypse, and they
want to be prepared.6 Shoko Asahara, leader of
the doomsday cult that released sarin gas in the
Tokyo subway in 1995, killing 12, told his
followers that in the coming conflict between
good and evil they would have to fight with every
available weapon.7 A similar belief system
explains the attraction to survivalism by Identity
Christians, white supremacists who believe in an
imminent Armageddon.
Premillennial Tension
Slight tension connected with the millen-
nium presumably affects most people. Many are
concerned about the Y2K problem, the prospect
that computer systems will malfunction or fail at
the end of 1999. Some fear the breakdown of air-
traffic control systems and are planning to avoid
traveling around January 1, 2000. Others fear
an accidental launch of Russian nuclear missiles
due to malfunctioning computers. Many are
stockpiling food and medicine or will have extra
cash on hand in case automated banking systems
fail. Some feel vague religious fears. Members of
antigovernment groups and religious cults are
often vulnerable psychologically and appear to
be especially affected by premillennial tension.
Larry Wayne Harris, a white supremacist and
born-again Christian, predicts that the Y2K bug
will cause a civil war in the United States and
that after January 1, 2000, the government will
be unable to deliver welfare checks and food
stamps for at least 3 years.8 He predicts that
biological attacks could be carried out by domestic
groups fighting for their heritage, traditions, and
communities, causing devastating plagues like
those described in the Bibles Book of
Revelation.9 He urges all U.S. citizens to
prepare. For some domestic groups, preparation
involves stockpiling weapons and training to use
them.
Exacting Revenge or Creating Chaos
Politically motivated terrorists who desire to
change societies rather than destroy them might
avoid killing very large numbers of people
because the political costs would exceed the
benefits.10 Some terrorists, however, want to
annihilate their enemies or demolish the societal
order. William Pierce, leader of the neo-Nazi
organization National Alliance, aims to initiate a
worldwide race war and establish an Aryan
state. We are in a war for the survival of our
race, he explains, that ultimately we cannot
win... except by killing our enemies... Its a case
of either we destroy them or they will destroy us,
with no chance for compromise or armistice.11
Creating social chaos is thus a worthwhile
objective in Pierces view. Ramzi Yousef,
organizer of the World Trade Center bombing,
claimed he was exacting revenge against the
United States.12 Osama bin Laden seems to have
similar motives.
Mimicking God
Terrorists hoping to create an aura of divine
retribution might be attracted to biological
agents. The fifth plague used by God to punish
the Pharaoh in the Bibles Book of Exodus was
murrain, a group of cattle diseases that includes
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7FBIS-SOV-97-09, 6 May 1997.  Source Moscow Trud, 6 May 1997, 1-2.
8Author Interview with Larry  Wayne Harris, 9 February 1999.
9Testimony of Larry Wayne Harris, State of Ohio v. Stephen Michael Wharf.
10The nature of the constituency is a key variable here. If the terrorists constituents see the targeted group as subhuman, or
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11Quotes from Klanwatch Intelligence Report (May 1996), 6-8.
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anthrax. In the fifth chapter of Samuel I, God
turned against the Philistines and smote them
with emerods. Medical historians consider these
emerods a symptom of bubonic plague.13 Some
terrorists may believe they are emulating God by
employing these agents.
The Aura of Science
Terrorists may want to impress their target
audience with high technology or with weapons
that appear more sophisticated than conven-
tional ones. Terrorists may find technology
appealing for various reasons. William Pierce,
who studied physics at California Institute of
Technology, is interested in high-technology
weapons. In his novel The Turner Diaries, right-
wing extremists use nuclear, chemical, biologi-
cal, and radiologic weapons to take over the
world. Pierce believes he can attract more
intelligent recruits to his organization over the
Internet than through radio or leaflets.14
The Copycat Phenomenon
Domestic extremists have shown greater
interest in chemical and biological weapons in
the last 5 years. For example, in 1998, members
of the Republic of Texas were convicted of
threatening to assassinate with biological agents
President Clinton, Attorney General Janet Reno,
and other officials.15 In May 1995, 6 weeks after
the Aum Shinrikyo incident on the Tokyo
subway, Larry Wayne Harris bought three vials
of  Yersinia pestis, the bacterium that causes
bubonic plague. No law prohibited Harris or any
other U.S. citizen from acquiring the agent. The
law has been tightened up since, although many
fear it is still not restrictive enough. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Louis
Freeh reports that a growing numberwhile
still smallof lone offender and extremist
splinter elements of right wing groups have been
identified as possessing or attempting to develop
or use weapons of mass destruction.16
In February 1998, Harris boasted to an
informant that he had enough military-grade
anthrax to wipe out all of Las Vegas. Eight bags
marked biological had been found in the back of
a car he and his accomplice were driving.17
Several days later, federal authorities learned
that the anthrax Harris had brought to Las
Vegas was a vaccine strain not harmful to
human health. Nevertheless, the incident
frightened many people and sparked a
proliferation of anthrax hoaxes and threats in
the second half of 1998 continuing into 1999 by
groups including Identity Christians and other
antigovernment groups, extortionists, anti-
abortion activists, and presumed prochoice
groups. In many cases, the perpetrators
motives were unknown, but some incidents
appear to have been student pranks, demon-
strating the extent to which the threat of
anthrax has entered U.S. consciousness
(Table).
Technical Factors
With the end of the cold war and the breakup
of the Soviet Union, weapons of mass destruction
and their components have become easier to
acquire. Underpaid former Soviet weapons
experts may be providing biological weapons and
expertise to Iran.18 South African biological
weapons scientists have offered their expertise to
Libya.19 State-sponsored groups are most
capable of overcoming technical barriers to
mass-casualty attacks, but the sponsor would
presumably weigh the risk for retaliation before
supporting this type of terrorist attack.
13Hans Zinsser, Rats, Lice and History (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1963), 110.
14Author interview with William Pierce, 22 April 1997.
15 Madeline Baro, FBI: Men Knew of Cactus Weapons, Threats, Associated Press/Corpus Christi Online, 27 October 1998;
found at: http://www.callertimes.com/autoconv/newstexmex98/newstexmex57.html.
16 Statement for the Record of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the United States Senate
Committee on Appropriations; Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies; February 4, 1999.
17One informant said that Harris said he had military-grade anthrax. Another said Harris referred to a vaccine or a placebo.
Proceedings before the Regular Federal Grand Jury, Testimony of Robert James, February 25, 1998,  United States District
Court, District of Nevada, p. 17. United States of America v. Larry Wayne Harris, Complete Transcript  of Proceedings, CR-2-
95-093, March 6, 1998, United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio.
18Judith Miller and William J. Broad, Bio-Weapons in Mind, Iranians Lure Needy Ex-Soviet Scientists, New York Times, 8
November 1998, A1 and Miller and Broad, Germ Weapons: In Soviet Past or in the New Russias Future? New York Times, 28
December 1998, A1.
19James Adams, Gadaffi Lures South Africas Top Germ Warfare Scientists, Sunday Times, 26 February 1995; Paul Taylor,
Toxic S. African Arms Raise Concern; US Wants Assurance 80s Program is Dead, Washington Post, 28 February 1995.520 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 5, No. 4, JulyAugust 1999
Special Issue
College-trained chemists and biologists could
presumably produce biological agents, although
they might have trouble disseminating them as
aerosols. Microorganisms can be disseminated
by air in two forms: as liquid slurries or as dry
powders. While producing liquid slurries is
relatively easy, disseminating them as respi-
rable infectious aerosols over large open areas is
not. Although dry powders can be disseminated
far more easily, high-quality powders require
substantial development, involving skilled
personnel and sophisticated equipment. Mill-
ing biological agents would require a level of
sophistication unlikely to be found among
many domestic terrorist groups. Far more
likely are low-technology incidents such as
contaminating foods, poisoning livestock, or
disseminating industrial poisons in an en-
closed space. Such attacks could still be lethal.
Major attacks cannot be ruled out; however,
governments need to prepare.
Table. Anthrax incidents in the United States, 1992–1999a
Year
1992 1997 1998
No. incidents     1      1      37
No. persons affectedb   20  100 5,529
Persons decontaminated,   20    30 1,202
  treated, or
  quarantinedb
Targets Residence Religious Government
organization   buildings and
  officials, indivi-
  duals, clinics,
  religious insti-
  utions, antiabor-
  tion activists,
  financial insti-
  tutions, schools,
  retail establish-
  ments, office
  buildings, media,
  nightclub
Purported motivators Malicious Anti-Semitism Antigovernment,
  alleged research,
  antiabortion, pro-
  choice retaliation,
  student pranks,
  delay court
  appearance
Dissemination Splattering Mail Dispersal on
  technique(s)   premises,
  modified ciga-
  rette lighter,
  moist towelettes,
  mail (envelope),
  explosive device,
  ventilation
  systems
Responses Perimeter sealed, Perimeter sealed, On-site inspec-
  medical   decontami-   tion, evaluation
  treatment   nation, medical   perimeter sealed,
  treatment   pamphlets
  provided,
  quarantine,
  decontamination,
  medical treatment
aThese data are presumed incomplete and may contain errors. Numbers are based on press reports and are not available for all
years. Data not independently confirmed.
bFigures do not include incidents in which numbers are not available; actual totals, therefore, may be understated.
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Organizational Factors
In the mid-1980s, a little-known survivalist
group called The Covenant, the Sword, and the
Arm of the Lord (CSA) acquired a large drum of
cyanide with the intention of poisoning water
supplies in major U.S. cities. At the time, CSA
was unusual among terrorist groups in that its
sole objective was large-scale murder rather
than influencing government policies. CSA
overcame two of three large obstacles to
successful employment of a chemical agent. It
had the motivation to use a chemical agent to kill
large numbers and no political or moral
constraints. The group had acquired a chemical
agent, although not in sufficient quantity to
contaminate city water supplies. The groups
leaders had not recruited technically trained
personnel and chose an unworkable dissemina-
tion technique. Moreover, the group lacked
discipline and was easily penetrated by FBI. It is
unlikely that CSA would make such mistakes if it
were operating today, when antigovernment
groups are so much more aware of the potential
of poison weapons for inflicting mass casual-
ties.20
CSA was run as a relatively open compound.
Some members wrote articles in local papers
espousing antigovernment beliefs, and some
worked in neighboring towns. Several former
CSA members became informants, often because
they hoped to get their sentences reduced for
other, unrelated, crimes. In recent years,
however, antigovernment groups have become
more aware of the danger of penetration by law-
enforcement authorities and have devised a new
way of organizing themselves called leaderless
resistance.21 Members are encouraged to act on
their own, minimizing their communication with
the leadership of the movement. Timothy
McVeigh operated according to this model. His
bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building
was originally conceived of by CSA, although it is
not clear that McVeigh knew of CSAs earlier
plot. If future terrorists with chemical or
biological agents act on their own or in small,
secretive groups, FBI may have difficulty
apprehending them.
One of CSAs objectives was to establish a
computerized, nationwide system linking right-
wing groups. This goal has been achieved,
although CSA is not exclusivelyor even
principallyresponsible for this achievement.
The nationwide linking of right-wing groups has
implications that have not been adequately
appreciated by the law enforcement community.
The Internet makes terrorist acts easier to carry
out. It facilitates leaderless resistance by
allowing leaders of the movement to communi-
cate with sympathizers worldwide without
having to meet face-to-face with their followers.
The Likeliest Perpetrators
A small but growing number of domestic
terrorists could attempt to use biological
weapons in the belief that doing so would
advance their goals. The most likely are religious
and extreme right-wing groups and groups
seeking revenge who view secular rulers and the
law they uphold as illegitimate. They are
unconstrained by fear of government or public
backlash, since their actions are carried out to
please God and themselves, not to impress a
secular constituency. Frequently, they do not
claim credit for their attacks since their ultimate
objective is to create so much fear and chaos that
the governments legitimacy is destroyed. Their
victims are often viewed as subhuman since they
are outside the groups religion or race.
Religiously motivated groups are increasing.
Of 11 international terrorist groups identified by
the Rand Corporation in 1968, none were
classified as religiously motivated. By 1994, a
third of the 49 international groups recorded in
the Rand-St. Andrews Chronology were classi-
fied as religious.22 Religious groups are not only
becoming more common; they are also more
violent than secular groups. In 1995, religious
groups committed only 25% of the international
incidents but caused 58% of the deaths.23
20For example, Kerry Noble claimed that if CSA leader James Ellison met someone who knew something about biological agents,
he might consider using them. Author interview with Kerry Noble, March 2, 1998.
21See Louis Beam, Leaderless Resistance, The Seditionist, Issue 12, February 1992. Found at: http://www.louisbeam.com/
leaderless.htm.
22Bruce Hoffman, Viewpoint: Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses, Nonproliferation Review (spring-summer
1997): 45-52.  Hoffman provides slightly different numbers in Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a
Religious Imperative (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, P-7834, 1993).
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25Author interview with Trochman, 9 February 1999.
26Author interview with William Pierce, 22 April 1997.
27Author interview with William Pierce.
Identity Christians believe that the Book of
Revelation is to be taken literally as a description
of future events. Many evangelical Protestants
believe in a doctrine of rapture: that the saved
will be lifted off the earth to escape the
apocalypse that will precede the Second Coming
of Christ. Followers of Christian Identity (and
some other millenarian sects), however, expect
to be present during the apocalypse.24 Because of
this belief, some followers of Christian Identity
believe they need to be prepared with every
available weapon to ensure their survival.
Organizational pressures could induce some
groups to commit extreme acts of violence.
Followers tend to be more interested in violence
for its own sake than in the groups purported
goals, making them less inhibited by moral or
political constraints than the leaders. Leaders
may have difficulty designing command and
control procedures that work. Offshoots of
established groups may be particularly danger-
ous. Groups may also become most violent when
the state is closing in on them, potentially posing
difficulties for those fighting terrorism. Another
factor is the nature of the leader. Charismatic
leaders who isolate their followers from the rest
of society often instill extreme paranoia among
their followers. Such groups can be susceptible to
extreme acts of violence.
Asked who he thought the most likely
domestic perpetrators of biological terrorism
were, John Trochman, a leader of the Montana
Militia, said that extremist offshoots of Identity
Christian groups are possible candidates, as are
disaffected military officers.25 Some antigovern-
ment groups are attempting to recruit inside the
U.S. military.26 William Pierce also foresees the
use of biological weapons by antigovernment
groups. People disaffected by the government
include not only the kind of people capable of
making pipe bombs. Bioweapons are more
accessible than are nuclear weapons.27
Conclusions
Terrorism with biological weapons is likely to
remain rare. This is especially the case for
attacks intended to create mass casualties,
which require a level of technologic sophistica-
tion likely to be possessed by few domestic
groups. While state-sponsored groups are most
likely to be capable of massive biological weapons
attacks, the state sponsor would presumably
have to weigh the risk for retaliation. As in the
case of other low-probability high-cost risks,
however, governments cannot ignore this
danger; the potential damage is unacceptably
high. Because the magnitude of the threat is so
difficult to calculate, however, it makes sense to
focus on dual-use remedies: pursuing medical
countermeasures that will improve public health
in general, regardless of whether major
biological attacks ever occur. This would include
strengthening the international system of
monitoring disease outbreaks in humans,
animals, and plants and developing better
pharmaceutical drugs.
The risk for overreaction must be considered.
If authorities are not prepared in advance, they
will be more susceptible to taking actions they
will later regret, such as revoking civil liberties.
Attacks employing biological agents are also
more likely and will be far more destructive if
governments are caught unprepared.
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